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Abstract: Determining the precise nature of the connection between preference, choice, and welfare 
has arguably been the central project in the field of welfare economics, which aims to offer a proper 
guide for economists in making policy decisions that affect people’s welfare. The two leading 
approaches here historically—the revealed preference and latent preference approaches—seem equally 
incapable of so guiding economists. I argue that the deadlock here owes to welfare economists’ failure 
to recognize a crucial distinction between two senses of “preference.” I analyze and defend these two 
senses of “preference,” and argue that each shares a close connection with just one of choice and 
welfare. This analysis reveals how economists should conceive of both the connections between 
“preference,” choice, and welfare, and the proper roles of these concepts in welfare economics. I 
conclude by showing this analysis to best explain the plausibility of two leading alternative approaches 




The central project in the field of welfare economics—whose ultimate aim is to offer a proper guide 
for economists in making policy decisions that affect people’s welfare—has arguably been that of 
determining the precise nature of the connection between preference, choice, and welfare. Debate 
here has largely focused on two leading approaches. More often than not, economists take 
preferences to determine choices, which are (therefore) taken to determine changes in welfare (or 
well-being).1 On this received view, a person is made better off to the extent that their preferences 
are satisfied. Since their preferences also determine their choices, economists can measure 
 
1 For overviews here, see Hausman 2012 (ch. 3) and Sen 1982 (ch. 2). 
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improvements and reductions in welfare in terms of what is chosen. Something is chosen only if it is 
preferred, and it makes one better off only if it is preferred and satisfied. Thus, when it is chosen, 
the preference is satisfied, and the subject is necessarily made better off. All choice then informs us 
of what is preferred, which in turn informs us of what impacts welfare.  
 One motivation for this received view is the robust predictions it allows economists to make 
about how different market and policy changes will affect people’s welfare. The tight connection this 
approach advances between preference, choice, and welfare makes both preference and welfare 
empirically measurable phenomena, as actual choices, which are of course easily measured, are all 
that are needed to measure preferences and welfare. But be that as it may, this may also be the only 
motivation for adopting the received view. The proposed connection between preference, choice, 
and welfare leads to entirely implausible views of welfare, preference, and human motivation more 
generally. As has been argued at length elsewhere, it cannot be the case that we always choose what 
we most prefer—at least, not in just any sense of “prefer”—nor can it be that our welfare consists 
simply in the satisfaction of just any of our preferences.2 After all, there are clear senses in which we 
can do what we do not most prefer to do—such as when we act purely out of a sense of duty—and 
in which we can prefer things that would only make us worse off—such as when we prefer to take 
on some harm in place of someone else.3 
 The received view, then—or the revealed preference approach—takes our preferences to be 
“revealed” by our choices, and the satisfaction of these preferences, as indicated by our choices, to 
constitute our well-being. As this approach faces significant problems, an alternative has naturally 
been introduced. On this second leading approach, preferences are still central, but they do not have 
as close a connection to choice as the revealed preference theorist claims. The preferences that 
 
2 See e.g. Hausman 2012 (ch. 7). These claims will be made more precise below. 
3 For some other well-known criticisms of this approach, see Sen 1982.  
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matter to welfare may not be revealed by choices, on this approach, because a person’s “true” or 
“latent” preferences may not always be expressed by the choices they make. As findings in 
behavioral economics have recently emphasized, human agents may be rational beings, but they are 
also imperfect such beings. Sometimes they miscalculate, suffer weakness of will, act on false beliefs, 
and fail to be perfectly rational in other ways. And these, it seems, are just the instances in which 
what they actually seem to prefer is not revealed by their choices, given their actual choices are just 
the result of these imperfections. Thus, on the latent preference approach, agents have a set of latent 
preferences, or preferences they would choose in accordance with if they were perfectly rational, and 
it is the satisfaction of these preferences that economists should be concerned with when 
considering changes in people’s welfare.4 
 Still, this approach, too, faces significant worries. For one, it is unclear how economists 
could determine what a person’s latent preferences are, and so how they could aim at satisfying 
them, given that as things stand people are far from perfectly rational. Of course, this 
epistemological worry doesn’t show that latent preferences are not what economists should 
ultimately be focused on in assessing changes in people’s welfare; it shows only that their ability to 
focus on these preferences is constrained. But this also hints at a deeper worry for the latent 
preference approach. In particular, it is far from clear that satisfying the preferences of one’s 
perfectly rational self would make one’s actual self any better off. These two versions of oneself 
might be quite different in terms of their interests. Thus if one were to satisfy the preferences of 
one’s perfectly rational self, one might be left cold, or even deeply upset, by the result. More 
importantly, and fundamentally, as in the case of the revealed preference approach, it simply cannot 
be the case that welfare consists in the satisfaction of just any of one’s preferences, whether latent or 
 
4 See e.g. Sunstein and Thaler 2003 and Thaler and Sunstein 2008; and, for discussion, see Infante et al. 2016. For a 
latent preference approach to well-being, see Railton 1986. 
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not. It seems obvious that one may prefer to take on some harm in place of another person without 
suffering any irrationality, meaning that one’s perfectly rational self might prefer this as well. Clearly, 
though, the satisfaction of one’s preference here need not make one any better off. So, if there is 
indeed some subset of preferences of human agents that perfectly track changes in their welfare—
and so a subset of preferences that economists concerned with people’s welfare should focus on—it 
cannot be the one the latent preference theorist identifies.  
 But if neither the revealed preference approach nor the latent preference approach gets the 
connection between preference, choice, and welfare right, then what is the correct connection 
between these concepts, and to what extent does this connection allow for measurement of the sort 
economists and policymakers concerned with welfare would like? More than just difficult, this 
question, as presently formulated, may even fail to admit of a single true answer. This is because, as 
some of the above claims have alluded to, there appears to be more than just one sense of 
“preference.” If that is right, then, presumably, there will be more than just one connection between 
“preference,” choice, and welfare. Indeed, there will presumably be one such connection for each 
sense of “preference” we specify. Examination of these distinct senses of “preference” and the 
connections they share with each of choice and welfare may shed light on a number of debates in 
welfare economics—such as that between revealed preference theorists and latent preference 
theorists—as well as on the limits of what we should expect or hope for debates in this field to 
ultimately achieve. More importantly, it may lead to analyses of the connections between 
“preference,” choice, and welfare that should ultimately guide economists in making policy decisions 
that affect people’s welfare. 
 The aim of this paper is to specify two such senses of “preference,” and to examine the 
implications of this distinction for the connection between, and measurement of, preference, choice, 
and welfare, as well as for welfare economics more generally. Section 1 introduces and defends these 
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two senses of “preference.” Section 2 examines the implications of this distinction for the 
connections between preference, choice, and welfare, and ultimately offers a novel analysis of the 
proper role of these concepts in welfare economics. Section 3 discusses the implications of this 
analysis for the measurement of preference, choice, and welfare. And section 4 discusses two of the 
leading alternative approaches to these topics offered by Daniel Hausman and Robert Sugden, and 
concludes that the approach offered here is not only more plausible than, but also best explains the 
plausibility of, these alternatives.  
 
1. Two senses of “preference” 
While the existence of the two distinct senses of “preference” I have in mind has gone largely 
unrecognized by economists, it has been touched on, if not fully explored, by several philosophers.5 
Perhaps the most notable such treatment has come from Daniel Hausman, who begins his extended 
analysis and critique of welfare economics by noting a distinction between what he calls “overall” 
preference and “total” preference. Despite the less-than-fully-illuminating labels, we can understand 
this distinction in terms of what the two types of preference take into consideration. Whereas overall 
preferences consider, as Hausman puts it, “most of what matters” to a subject, total preferences 
consider “everything that matters” to them.6 To clarify, Hausman adds that whereas overall 
preferences are generally taken to compete with some other factors, such as obligations or duties, total 
preferences, as they take “everything” that matters into account, also account for these other factors. 
To illustrate, he offers the following examples: 
 
 
5 See e.g. Hausman 2012 (pp. 3-4), Sumner 1996 (p. 120), and Wedgwood 2017 (pp. 78-79). 
6 Hausman 2012 (p. 3).  
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(1)  Jill drank water rather than wine with dinner, despite preferring to drink wine, because 
she promised her husband she would stay sober. 
 
(2)  Jill drank water with dinner because she preferred to do so. But for the promise she 
made to her husband to stay sober, she would have preferred to drink wine rather than 
water with dinner.7 
 
Here there are two entirely natural senses of “prefer,” and Hausman takes his distinction to explain 
them: the first sense corresponds to “overall” preference, while the second sense corresponds to 
“total” preference. So while the terminology may, again, tend toward confusion, the idea here is that 
whereas “overall” preference corresponds to some partial aspect of what matters to the subject at 
the time of choice (and thus competes with Jill’s promise), “total” preference corresponds to all of 
what matters to the subject at that time (and thus accounts for her promise).  
 This, though, hardly explains the difference between Jill’s psychological states in (1) and (2). 
It is unclear both which aspects of “what matters” to Jill are left out in the case of “overall” 
preference, and, more fundamentally, what is meant in the first place by “what matters” to her. Of 
course, this is not to deny that Hausman is on to something in offering his distinction—quite the 
opposite. There are clearly two distinct senses of “preference” here. But his analysis is not precise 
enough to allow for the kind of robust implications about the connection between preference, 
choice, and welfare, or about the state of welfare economics, that we are looking for here.  
 
7 Hausman 2012 (p. 3). 
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 Consider then what is meant by “what matters” to Jill.8 Presumably this means something 
like: what is (and isn’t) in Jill’s interest. And this, presumably, means something like: what promotes 
or contributes to (and hinders) Jill’s goals or needs. More precisely, it seems to mean: what would 
satisfy or frustrate Jill’s desires and (their negative counterpart) aversions. To be sure, there are a 
number of leaps in reasoning here, but consider: as it relates to a choice scenario, it seems that what 
matters to someone in that scenario will be affected just in case the satisfaction or frustration of 
something they desire or are averse to is affected in that scenario. It matters to Jill, for instance, 
whether she has wine with dinner, both because she desires to have it, and because she is averse to 
breaking her promise. If she had just one of these attitudes, it would still matter to her whether she 
had the wine, either because she simply wanted it, or because she was simply averse to breaking her 
promise. Yet if she had neither of the attitudes, and no other desires or aversions relating to the 
choice, then it would not matter to her whether she had wine with dinner—she would be 
indifferent. While this single case certainly does not settle the matter, it at least gives us good reason 
to think that what matters to a subject, and so what preferences serve to take into account, is a 
function of that subject’s desires and aversions.9,10 
 You may find this explanation of preference in terms of desire and aversion implausible. But 
notice that the proposed link here leads naturally to a particularly illuminating explanation of our 
two senses of “preference,” and an explanation of which of our interests are bracketed in the case of 
just one of these senses. This explanation begins by pointing out the intuitively obvious yet oft-
neglected difference between desires had when we are genuinely attracted to or enthused by 
something, and desires whose possession is merely entailed by our being disposed to act so as to 
 
8 My focus here on analyzing what it is for something to matter to a subject is meant only as an intuitive way of reaching, 
from Hausman’s starting point, a deeper analysis of what preferences serve to take into account. Whether we commit to 
the former analysis is largely unimportant for present purposes. 
9 Davis (1981) offers a similar analysis.  
10 I’ll sometimes speak just of desire or aversion below, but I take the pair, as positive and negative compliments of one 
another, to be fundamentally relevant to a subject’s preferences. 
 8 
satisfy them in certain circumstances. That is, sometimes when we desire things, we’re genuinely 
attracted to the things—we’re not merely disposed to get them, but are enthused or excited by them. 
Following Chris Heathwood, we can call desire of this sort genuine desire.11 On the other hand, there 
are also cases where our desiring something entails only that we are disposed to get the thing in 
certain circumstances. We have desires of this sort when, for instance, we visit the dentist despite 
loathing the very thought of doing so. Since we go to the dentist, we must have in one sense been 
motivated to go, and must have in that same sense desired to go. Clearly, though, it’s not the case 
that we genuinely desired to go; and, indeed, what we genuinely desired to do was not to go. Call 
desire in this stripped-down, merely motivational sense behavioral desire. 
 It seems clear that “desire” admits of these two senses. It also seems clear that “preference” 
admits of two similar senses. The most plausible explanation for this, it appears, is that “preference” 
has this feature because “desire” does. That is, there are two senses in which we can prefer because 
there are two senses in which we can desire, and preference is partly constituted by desire. To see 
this, consider the following analogs of Hausman’s examples: 
 
(1*)  Jill drank water with dinner, despite desiring to drink wine, because she promised her 
husband she would stay sober. 
 
(2*)  Jill drank water with dinner because that is what she most desired to do. But for the 




11 Heathwood 2019. The same distinction has been made in different terms by a number of philosophers—see e.g. Lewis 
1988 (p. 323), Parfit 2011 (p. 43), and Sumner 1996 (p. 120). 
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Here we can see a clear parallel between our two senses of “desire” and Hausman’s two senses of 
“preference.” In (1*), Jill’s desire is genuine—just as, in (1), her preference is “overall;” and in (2*), 
Jill’s desire is behavioral—just as, in (2), her preference is “total.” As we have seen, in the case of 
preference, it seems some considerations, like Jill’s promise, compete with her overall preference, 
but not her total preference. This is naturally explained by the current analysis: acting on her 
promise is clearly not something to which Jill is genuinely attracted, and so this consideration 
competes with her overall preference, or with what her genuine attractions and aversions tell in 
favor of; yet, when deciding on her act, Jill clearly took her promise into account, which means that 
her promise factored into her total preference, or into what she most desired, in the behavioral 
sense, to do. Given the plausibility of this explanation, as well as the relative inconvenience of 
Hausman’s terminology, we can again follow Heathwood’s lead and call preferences which take all 
of a subject’s relevant desires and aversions into account behavioral preferences, and preferences 
which take only a subject’s relevant genuine desires and aversions into account genuine preferences. 
 In addition to plausibly explaining the two senses of “preference” that Hausman points out, 
the analysis on which preference is partly constituted by desire accounts for what would otherwise 
be a striking overlap in the fundamental features of desire and preference. Consider the following 
typical features of preferences: (i) they entail motivation, or dispositions to act so as to make their 
objects more likely to obtain; (ii) they tend to cause pleasure when they are seen as or imagined to be 
satisfied, and displeasure when they are seen as or imagined to be frustrated; (iii) they tend to direct 
our attention toward things we associate with their objects; and (iv) they tend to have amplified such 
effects when we have sensory or imaginative representations of things we associate with their 
objects.12 Thus, when Jill prefers to have wine rather than water with dinner, she is disposed to act 
so as to make it more likely that she will have wine; she will tend to experience pleasure when she 
 
12 For discussion of these features as they relate to desire, see Sinhababu 2017 (ch. 2). 
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sees herself as having wine with dinner or imagines that she will, and displeasure when she sees 
herself as not having wine or imagines that she won’t; she will be apt to attend to things like the 
wine glass on the table or corkscrew in the drawer; and these effects will be amplified when she sees, 
smells, or imagines the taste of, the wine. All of these things will seem equally true of her when she 
desires to have the wine. The most plausible explanation here seems to be that these things are true 
of her when she has this preference in virtue of their being true of her when she has this desire.  
 It may be wondered whether this analysis puts things the wrong way around. Granted, desire 
and preference share these features. But perhaps desire is partly constituted by preference, rather 
than the other way around.13 While this suggestion is worth considering, however, there seem to be a 
number of strong reasons to reject it.14 For one, preferences are essentially comparative, whereas 
desires are not. You cannot prefer A when A is all there is. Of course, you can prefer A to nothing, 
but then there is something else, namely nothing, to which A is preferred. In contrast, you can 
clearly desire A when A is all there is. It does not matter whether there is anything else—you desire 
A just the same. This suggests that preference is a comparison or ranking of something more basic, 
like desire. For another, it seems that you cannot have a preference as to A and B when you are 
affectively neutral as to everything relevant to A and B. If you have no desire for or aversion to 
anything relating to either A or B, it seems that you cannot have a preference with respect to them. 
Of course, you can have a preference when you are affectively neutral as to everything relating to 
one of A and B: you may desire or be averse to something relating to the other. But this is not 
 
13 This seems to be the view of e.g. Spurrett (2021). See also Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006; and, for discussion, see 
Schroeder 2020. 
14 An additional such reason is due to Pollock (2006, pp. 22-27), who argues that the number of basic pairwise 
preferences that would be required just to determine facts about the extent to which any given thing was preferred over 
any other given thing would be far greater than the number of particles in the universe. Thus if preferences were the 
more basic attitude, facts about the strengths of desires could only be determined by an astronomically large number of 
more basic facts, somehow stored in the brain, about pairwise preferences. Alternatively, if desires were the more basic 
attitude, Pollock suggests, the very same facts about the strengths of desires and preferences could be determined by just 
600 basic facts about desires. And so, taking desires to be the more basic attitude seems the more psychologically 
realistic view. 
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possible when you are neutral as to all that relates to both. If, for instance, there is nothing relating 
to the fact that 2+2=4 that you have a desire for or aversion to—if you are affectively neutral as to 
everything relating to that fact—and you stand in the same position toward the fact that 3+3=6, you 
cannot prefer one fact to the other. So, it seems, you cannot have a preference without having a 
relevant desire or aversion. In contrast, you can desire A or B without having any preference as to A 
or B. If, for instance, you now desire a cold glass of water, and also desire not to miss your flight 
later, you may not prefer one of these things to the other, because you have not been compelled to 
weigh them against each other—or, because you have no reason to think they are in tension. Yet if 
you are then told that you will miss your flight if you go to get the water, your newly conflicting 
desires will suddenly give way to a preference for one over the other. Consequently, it seems you can 
have desires and aversions without having relevant preferences, but cannot have preferences without 
having relevant desires or aversions. This, too, suggests that desire is more basic than, and indeed 
partly constitutes, preference.  
 It seems, therefore, that there are two senses of “preference,” and that this is ultimately 
explained by the facts that there are two senses of “desire,” and that desire is partially constitutive of 
preference. While I take this explanation to offer the best motivation for and illumination of the 
proposed distinction between genuine and behavioral preferences, though, it is also worth noting 
that the distinction can be accepted even without endorsing my preferred explanation of it. Thus 
even those who reject the view that preference is partially constituted by desire can accept the 
intuitive distinction between genuine and behavioral preferences, and so follow us in exploring the 
implications of this distinction for debates in welfare economics. As we have seen, it seems clear, 
more generally, that recognizing this distinction in types of preference is crucial to assessing claims 
about preference: even something as simple as whether Jill prefers to drink wine or water with 
dinner cannot be determined without specifying the sense of “prefers” we invoke. When economists 
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and others typically talk of preference, however, this distinction goes entirely ignored. As may be 
expected, this has led to some deep tensions in the ideas and goals of welfare economics, whose 
most fundamental challenge has arguably been to determine the precise nature of the connection 
between preference, choice, and welfare.  
 
2. The connections between “preference,” choice, and welfare 
Recall that on the revealed preference view in welfare economics, well-being consists in the 
satisfaction of preference, and something is chosen only if it is most preferred. While this view faces 
many familiar problems, it is not entirely obvious exactly where it goes wrong. Indeed, each of its 
claims even seems to have a certain ring of truth: we tend to be better off when our preferences are 
satisfied as opposed to when they are not, and our choosing something seems to entail that we were 
most motivated, and so most preferred, to choose that thing. Once we recognize the distinction 
between genuine and behavioral preference, however, we can see precisely where this approach goes 
wrong.  
 Since behavioral preference is just preference that takes every motivating factor in a choice 
situation into account, it seems clear that the connection between behavioral preference and choice 
must be quite strong. Indeed, it seems that strength of behavioral preference is most plausibly 
understood as a function of hypothetical choice: the more circumstances in which one would (be 
most motivated to) choose the thing, the stronger one’s behavioral preference. More importantly, 
since it follows by definition that one always chooses in accordance with one’s strongest behavioral 
preference, the connection between this sort of preference and choice is even necessary. Obviously 
enough, though, the connection between choice and genuine preference can be nowhere near this 
strong. After all, we constantly choose to do things that we do not most genuinely prefer to do: we 
go to the dentist despite genuinely preferring to stay home; we go to the early meeting despite 
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genuinely preferring to stay in bed. Every day we make choices that do not reflect our strongest 
genuine preferences. So we have, on the one hand, a sense of “preference” that shares a necessary 
connection with choice; and, on the other hand, a sense of “preference” whose connection to choice 
is not only not necessary, but too weak to even be evidential.  
 Of course, this divergence alone does nothing to threaten the revealed preference approach, 
since it might be that the type of preference that shares a necessary connection with choice also 
shares the sort of connection with welfare that the approach proposes. That is, it might be that the 
satisfaction of behavioral preference is what constitutes well-being. In that case, the revealed 
preference approach will get things exactly right: we choose something only if it is what we most 
(behaviorally) prefer, and our well-being is enhanced if and only if our (behavioral) preferences are 
satisfied; thus, when we choose something, we are made better off by getting that thing. It again 
seems obvious, however, that behavioral preference shares no such connection with welfare. Indeed, 
despite its necessary connection with choice, behavioral preference shares a merely incidental 
connection with welfare—its satisfaction is neither necessary nor sufficient for, but may sometimes 
occur alongside, improvements in welfare. If, for instance, you most behaviorally prefer to be 
tortured for ten minutes rather than to be tortured for twenty minutes, your being tortured for ten 
minutes will not in itself make you better off; and if you are unaware that having a delicious meal is 
available as an alternative to being tortured for any amount of time, your getting the delicious meal 
might in itself make you better off despite your failing to behaviorally prefer this. Still, sometimes we 
manage to choose what is best for us: you might behaviorally prefer to have the delicious meal upon 
learning that it is an option. Sometimes, then, our behavioral preferences are satisfied, and our 
welfare is improved. But not always. And, arguably, not even that often. Like choice, though, welfare 
does seem to share a close connection with one of our types of preference. In this case, however, it 
is genuine preference. Just as behavioral preference could be plausibly linked to choice, so genuine 
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preference can be plausibly linked to welfare.15 Indeed, there is a good deal of plausibility in the 
claim that a subject’s welfare is enhanced if and only if their genuine preferences are satisfied.16 After 
all, if they genuinely prefer something (like the delicious meal, but not like the ten minutes of 
torture), then they are more genuinely attracted to that thing than some other thing; and so, between 
getting the one thing or the other, they seem to do better by getting what they are more genuinely 
attracted to. Of course, it might be that they now genuinely prefer something that will later be bad 
for them, like addictive drugs, to something else that will later be better for them, like sobriety. But, 
at least at the time of getting the drugs rather than sobriety, considered in isolation, it seems 
plausible that their welfare is enhanced by the enjoyment they experience. So, there is no satisfaction 
of genuine preference without an (immediate) improvement of welfare here.17 More generally, and 
precisely, it seems plausible that whenever one’s genuine preferences appear to one to be satisfied, 
 
15 In fact, Heathwood’s (2019) aim in introducing his distinction between behavioral and genuine desire is to show that 
only genuine desires are directly relevant to well-being. Given my arguments that (genuine) preference is partly 
constituted by (genuine) desire, then, his conclusions seem to support the current point. 
16 Importantly, however, I myself will not endorse the “only if” portion of this biconditional when making my view 
more precise just below. This is because, as I’ve argued earlier, it seems possible for a subject to have a genuine desire 
for A without also having formed a genuine preference for A (over, say, B). And since, plausibly, the (apparent) 
satisfaction of a genuine desire for A entails the same sort of intuitively-welfare-promoting experience as the (apparent) 
satisfaction of a genuine preference for A, it seems this sort of experience can be had, and welfare can intuitively be 
enhanced, without a corresponding genuine preference having even been formed, let alone (apparently) satisfied.  
More importantly, though, since this line of reasoning clearly depends on my earlier argument for the view that 
preference is partly constituted by desire, those who resist this argument or view more generally do not face similar 
pressure to refrain from endorsing the biconditional in full. That is why I mention it as an alternative here. 
17 As I appeal explicitly to enjoyment in suggesting that the subject is made better off in this case, it may be wondered, 
more generally, whether the account offered here ultimately constitutes a form of hedonism, which takes pleasure (or 
enjoyment) to be what is ultimately good for us. After all, when we genuinely prefer something and appear to be getting 
it, it seems plausible to categorize us as simply being pleased. Here I have three points in response. First, as Heathwood 
(2019) similarly notes, the debate over the nature of pleasure is contentious, and nothing I say here requires taking a 
robust stand on it. The account I’m offering concerns the connection between genuine preference and welfare; should 
the true theory of the nature of pleasure turn out to be relevant here, so be it. Second, even if this theory of pleasure 
implies that the apparent satisfaction of genuine preference constitutes pleasure, it still might be that the true theory of 
welfare turns out to be either hedonism, or a pluralistic view on which pleasure is one of multiple things that directly 
contribute to well-being, and in either case the claims here regarding the connection between genuine preference and 
welfare would be vindicated. Finally, to the extent that apparent genuine preference satisfaction does overlap with 
pleasure, this may be a welcome result from a practical perspective, as a good deal of psychological research on the 
measurement of pleasure and its relation to welfare has recently been inspired by (most notably) the work of Daniel 
Kahneman. See e.g. Kahneman et al. 1999.  
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one is made at least somewhat better off.18 At the very least, this seems to be the closest we will get 
to plausibly linking the satisfaction of “preference” with improvement in welfare.  
 But regardless of how plausible we find this approach, it’s worth taking a step back to notice 
the implications of these arguments for the nature of the connections between “preference,” choice, 
and welfare. The revealed preference approach takes (i) well-being to consist in the satisfaction of 
“preference,” and (ii) choice to be determined by strength of “preference.” Once we recognize the 
distinction between genuine and behavioral preference, however, we are able to see that any 
plausibility had by this view is based on a conflation of two senses of “preference.” Its first claim has 
a ring of truth in virtue of the nature of genuine preference, and its second claim has a ring of truth 
in virtue of the nature of behavioral preference. As we have just seen, however, its first claim also 
seems clearly false in virtue of the nature of behavioral preference, and its second claim seems 
clearly false in virtue of the nature of genuine preference. Thus, neither sense of “preference” 
outlined here allows for a plausible connection between itself, choice, and welfare of the proposed 
sort. And so, some part of the revealed preference approach must be given up. The connections 
between these concepts cannot be as strong as many economists and philosophers had hoped.  
 
18 This is formulated in terms of apparent satisfaction, rather than actual satisfaction, so as to avoid counterexamples 
involving genuine preferences that are satisfied despite their subject failing to know it. Thus, for instance, I might 
genuinely prefer for your life to go well, and it might go well despite my being entirely unaware of it (Parfit 1984, p. 494). 
In this case, the satisfaction of my preference does not seem to make me any better off, since I never actually consider 
its satisfaction. Its satisfaction only seems good for me provided it appears to me to be satisfied—or, provided the thing 
I’m genuinely attracted to appears to me to be the case.  
Of course, this focus on apparent or “subjective” satisfaction as opposed to actual or “objective” satisfaction 
brings with it a number of familiar worries. Most notably, cases where subjects are deceived into falsely believing that 
their genuine preferences—for, say, having a loving family and successful business—are being satisfied seem to suggest 
that apparent satisfaction cannot be all that matters to well-being (Kagan 1994). After all, the deceived subject’s 
appearances might be identical to those they would have if they were not deceived, yet if they were not deceived they 
would intuitively seem better off. As I see it, however, these cases aren’t particularly troubling for the current proposal. 
This is because, even when subjects are deceived, the apparent satisfaction of their relevant genuine preferences, in itself, 
still intuitively makes them at least somewhat better off. This at least puts the apparent satisfaction approach in a better 
position to respond to its worries than the objective satisfaction approach, since the cases undermining the latter 
approach seem to show that the objective satisfaction of preferences sometimes intuitively makes subjects no better off.  
In any case, having noted this qualifier about appearance in the view, I will largely omit it in what follows. 
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 Consider next the implications of the current analysis for the alternative, latent preference 
approach in welfare economics. This approach takes (i) well-being to consist in the satisfaction of 
perfectly rational “preference,” and (ii) choice to be determined by strength of actual (imperfectly 
rational) “preference.” Again, any apparent plausibility here is explained by the conflation of genuine 
and behavioral preference. As in the case of the revealed preference approach, its second claim has a 
ring of truth in virtue of the nature of behavioral preference, which is defined so as to make the 
claim a necessary truth. Its first claim, on the other hand, has a ring of truth not just in virtue of the 
nature of genuine preference, but also in virtue of the fact—which ultimately motivates the move 
from revealed preferences to latent preferences with respect to analyzing well-being—that our 
perfectly rational selves would presumably come closer to maximizing the satisfaction of our 
genuine preferences than we do: with full information and rationality, they would presumably make 
fewer errors in bringing about states of affairs that were most genuinely attractive. Still, since this 
claim ignores the distinction between genuine and behavioral preference, it implies that the 
satisfaction of the behavioral preferences of our perfectly rational selves would improve our welfare 
in just the same way the satisfaction of their genuine preferences would. And this means that the 
approach implies—implausibly, as we’ve seen—that the satisfaction of our perfectly rational selves’ 
merely behavioral preference to take on some harm in place of another person would directly 
improve our well-being.19 Again, then, both the apparent plausibility and ultimate failure of the latent 
 
19 Here it might be objected that my own view faces a similar worry. Specifically, if one had a genuine preference to take 
on some harm in place of another person, the view might seem to imply that the satisfaction of this preference would 
make one better off, despite clearly harming one. Here, however, two things are worth noticing. First, it is not the actual 
satisfaction, but the apparent satisfaction, of this genuine preference that the view claims would make one better off; and 
second, the view claims just that this apparent satisfaction would in itself make one at least somewhat better off. Thus if one 
genuinely preferred to take on the harm, and ultimately did so, the view implies that one would be made at least somewhat 
better off specifically in virtue of the thing one was attracted to appearing to one to be the case. It does not imply that 
actually saving the other, in itself, would make one better off; nor that doing so would make one better off, all things 
considered. Indeed, so long as the harm involved in saving the other entailed the apparent satisfaction of some of one’s 
genuine aversions (like one’s genuine aversion to pain) or the apparent frustration of one’s genuine desires (like one’s 
genuine desire to exercise), and these experiences outweighed the fleeting experience of apparently satisfying one’s 
genuine desire to save the other, the proposed view would tell us that saving the other made one worse off, all things 
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preference approach is plausibly explained in terms of the conflation of behavioral and genuine 
preference. 
 We are left, then, with the following analysis of the connections between “preference,” 
choice, and welfare. Behavioral preference, by definition, shares a necessary connection with choice: 
our choices necessarily reveal our behavioral preferences, in that we necessarily choose what we 
most behaviorally prefer. Nonetheless, behavioral preference shares a merely incidental connection 
with welfare: it is only when we choose in accordance with our genuine preferences, which then by 
definition overlap with our behavioral preferences, that the satisfaction of our behavioral 
preferences is accompanied by a change in welfare. Genuine preferences, on the other hand, share a 
close connection with welfare: their apparent satisfaction seems in every case to come with at least 
some improvement in welfare. Yet, as evidenced by choices we make every day, our choices do not 
always, and arguably do not even often, accord with what we most genuinely prefer. It seems, 
therefore, that neither sense of “preference” can play the role that economists concerned with 
changes in people’s welfare would like. Neither seems to share a close enough connection with both 
choice and welfare to warrant the measure of welfare in terms of choice.    
 
3. The measurement of “preference,” choice, and welfare 
Assuming the current analysis is correct, is there any hope of carrying on with the welfare 
economist’s goal of reliably measuring welfare, in terms of choice, via preference? Well, while there 
still may be hope of reliably measuring welfare in terms of preference—at least in one sense of 
“preference”—it seems that the sense of “preference” that would allow for such reliable 
measurement could not be reliably measured in terms of choice, and so that any reliable measure of 
 
considered, even though the apparent satisfaction of one’s genuine desire to save the other, in itself, made one at least 
somewhat better off. This seems to me exactly right. 
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welfare in terms of preference will not focus on choices. That is, since genuine preference shares a 
close connection with welfare, but not choice, and behavioral preference does not share a close 
connection with welfare, the current analysis implies that any reliable measure of welfare via 
preference will not focus on choices. Insofar as the economist is interested in measuring changes in 
well-being via preference, the type of preference she should be concerned with is, not behavioral 
preference, but genuine preference. And since genuine preferences do not share a close connection 
with choices, she will have to find some other way of measuring the satisfaction of genuine 
preferences to get to evidence of improvements in welfare. The challenge, then, is to determine how 
the satisfaction of genuine preference might be measured.  
 Immediately, however, a serious problem arises: it is not at all clear how to reliably measure 
the contents of people’s mental states. While we could, if we knew these contents, in many cases 
easily measure whether they were satisfied, there does not appear to be any easy way of determining 
the precise contents themselves. Of course, we might try the most obvious method available here, 
which is to simply ask people what they genuinely prefer. But this method will only take us so far. 
After all, people are often mistaken about their own mental states, especially their affective or 
emotional ones.20 What’s more, people often succumb to the sorts of failures that the latent 
preference theorist was concerned to rule out: they are often unsure of all the relevant alternatives, 
and suffer from failures of rationality like weakness of will. In these cases, people’s reports of their 
own genuine preferences may not reflect what they actually genuinely prefer, and so may not be a 
reliable measure of what would enhance their welfare.  
 So simple self-reports will not be enough. Is there any other way we might reliably measure 
the satisfaction of people’s genuine preferences? Well, one optimistic suggestion is that the 
satisfaction of these preferences will be reliably tracked by the satisfaction of people’s behavioral 
 
20 See e.g. Haybron 2008 (ch. 10). 
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preferences. Thus, when people make choices, and so act on their strongest behavioral preferences, 
they provide reliable evidence of what they most genuinely preferred when making those choices. 
But this suggestion is obviously implausible. As we’ve seen, we constantly do things that we do not 
genuinely prefer to do—and, indeed, things that we genuinely prefer not to do—in our everyday 
lives. If self-reports are not reliable enough to reliably measure genuine preference, then behavioral 
preference will not even come close.  
 If there is any way of reliably measuring the satisfaction of people’s genuine preferences, it is 
at least not immediately clear what it might be.21 So as to avoid an entirely negative conclusion here, 
though, it may be worth mentioning (however briefly) one alternative that welfare economists might 
adopt in attempting to track and improve people’s welfare. This is to focus on opportunity for 
(apparent) genuine preference satisfaction. This would presumably leave them to focus on people’s 
access to things like health, work, hobbies, social groups, and other things that have an 
overwhelming tendency to promote (apparent) genuine preference satisfaction. In addition to 
securing at least some evidential link to people’s welfare, this approach would also leave the actual 
realization of the relevant opportunities up to the people themselves, and so with respect to policy 
decisions would seem consistent with considerations of liberal neutrality. While this is, admittedly, 
no more than the most cursory of sketches of the alternative in mind, it at least seems worth 





21 At least at present. In principle, though, given the ultimate focus here is on the psychological phenomenon of 
apparent genuine preference satisfaction, it certainly seems that the particular portion of the brain associated with this 
phenomenon could ultimately be discovered and measured directly. Also, as I’ve mentioned, the path to such reliable 
measurement may be considerably clearer if there turns out to be a significant enough overlap between the apparent 
satisfaction of genuine preference and pleasure—see fn. 17. 
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4. Hausman and Sugden on welfare economics 
Before closing, it’s worth considering how the current analysis of the connection between 
“preference,” choice, and welfare compares to, and ultimately improves on, influential analyses 
offered by other welfare economists. Consider first then Daniel Hausman’s view of how economists 
should understand the connection between these concepts. Since, as ongoing debate illustrates, we 
are of course unsure of what well-being consists in, Hausman notes that relying on any particular 
proposal for the purposes of welfare policy would seem unjustified. Nonetheless, he thinks, 
economists can instead rely on certain “platitudes” about well-being, which together constitute a 
“folk theory” of the concept.22 These include claims such as “having good friends typically makes 
people’s lives better,” and “other things being equal, adequate nutrition makes a person better off.” 
Now, since Hausman takes the sense of “preference” that is relevant to welfare economists to be 
behavioral preference (or, in his terms, “total” preference), his aim is to link this “folk” conception 
of welfare to behavioral preference and thus choice. So, his question is: if economists accept his folk 
theory of well-being, under what conditions can they justifiably take people’s choices, and so the 
satisfaction of people’s behavioral preferences, to indicate improvements in well-being? And his 
answer is, when the people meet the following three conditions: (i) they are adequately informed 
regarding their feasible option set; (ii) they exercise good judgment over those options; and (iii) they 
choose on the basis of self-interest—or, on the basis of what would promote their own well-being.23 
Plausibly, when people meet these three conditions—which economists can determine by appealing 
to Hausman’s simple folk theory—economists are justified in taking people’s choices, and so the 
satisfaction of their behavioral preferences, to provide evidence of what is good for them.  
 
22 Hausman 2012 (ch. 8). 
23 Hausman 2012 (p. 89). 
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 The approach offered here seems well-positioned to explain the apparent plausibility of 
Hausman’s view. The idea of choosing on the basis of “self-interest” can be plausibly understood as 
meaning that one chooses on the basis of one’s relevant genuine desires and aversions, or on the 
basis of all of what one is genuinely attracted and averse to in the choice context. So, when people 
meet Hausman’s third condition, it seems plausible that they are choosing from the apparent 
alternatives on the basis of what they most genuinely prefer; which, the current account says, is 
precisely what is needed for well-being to be improved. However, since people might be unaware of 
some option that they would genuinely prefer (or would genuinely prefer even more), we must also 
assume that the people are adequately informed in order to conclude that their choice really is 
evidence of what is good for them—that is, we must assume his first condition. And since people 
sometimes act irrationally, we must also assume that their choice here is not the result of any 
obvious such error—that is, we must also assume his second condition. Putting all these together: 
when Hausman’s conditions are met, the relevant subjects rationally satisfy their strongest genuine 
preference in the relevant circumstances. That is, with respect to their genuine desires and aversions 
and the conditions they’re in, they choose optimally. In that case, it is clear why it seems plausible 
that economists are justified in taking their choices to provide evidence of what is good for them 
here. They are doing the very best they can relative to both their genuine attractions and 
circumstances.  
 Now, obviously enough, this explanation of Hausman’s view in terms of the current analysis 
does little, if anything, to threaten his view. It is simply an explanation of why his view seems to 
have some intuitive plausibility. Notice, though, that if we adopt the analysis offered here of 
behavioral and genuine preference, and the connections each shares with choice and welfare, then 
we have available a deeper or more basic explanation of why Hausman’s view might be true. This 
suggests that the current analysis goes further than Hausman’s own in getting at the precise nature 
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of the connections between “preference,” choice, and welfare. And this suggests that, regardless of 
whether we agree with Hausman’s approach, its truth or apparent truth will ultimately be best 
explained in terms of the analysis offered here.24 
 Consider next Robert Sugden’s view, which departs from the analyses discussed here by 
focusing on options, rather than choices or preferences.25 Earlier, I mentioned a potential approach 
to normative welfare economics that focuses on opportunity for (apparent) genuine preference 
satisfaction. The motivation behind this approach was that, if genuine preference is indeed the sort 
of preference that is relevant to welfare, then because genuine preferences, as mental states, are 
exceedingly difficult to measure or track, we might do better to focus on people’s opportunities for 
genuine preference satisfaction, since this is more easily measurable in terms of the things like jobs 
and health resources that are available to them, than we would by focusing on people’s actual mental 
states. Still, these mental states are ultimately what we want to get at, on this approach—they are 
what economists should ultimately aim to track or measure. Sugden’s view is similar in that it claims 
that economists should be focused on something antecedent to preference in designing policies that 
affect welfare, but it is dissimilar in that it claims that this antecedent thing is also what economists 
should ultimately be aiming to track or measure. That is, Sugden argues that opportunities should be 
what economists focus on in designing policies that affect people’s welfare, and that this is because 
opportunities themselves, rather than any preference satisfaction they might allow for, are ultimately 
the thing that matters or is good for people. Thus, on this view, “as viewed by each citizen 
separately, more opportunity for that person is better than less,” and “individuals collectively should 
have as much opportunity as possible to carry out whatever voluntary transactions they might want 
 
24 A similar point holds for any version of the latent preference approach that adopts conditions like Hausman’s 
(requiring all relevant information, good judgment, and pure self-interest) in specifying the set of preferences whose 
satisfaction directly contributes to well-being. 
25 Sugden 2018 and Sugden 2019. 
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to make” (Sugden 2019, p. 421). The idea is then that opportunities are not only a useful way of 
measuring what should be of ultimate importance to welfare economists, but are themselves what is 
of ultimate import.  
 Again, it seems any apparent plausibility of Sugden’s view is ultimately explainable in terms 
of the analysis offered here. Opportunities are good for people in virtue of the fact that they are 
necessary means to satisfying preferences: a person obviously cannot satisfy their preferences if 
there are no opportunities for them to do so. Still, to say that opportunities are the source of 
goodness in this equation seems to mistake the means to goodness for goodness itself.26 After all, we 
can easily imagine a subject who has “as much opportunity as possible to carry out whatever 
voluntary transactions they might want to make” throughout their entire life, yet who spends their 
entire life sleeping or inactive. In this case, it seems implausible to say of this person’s life after it has 
ended that it went just as well as a life with the same amount of opportunity as well as a great deal of 
genuine preference satisfaction. To take the point to the extreme: Sugden’s view implies that a public 
policy designed to ensure that everyone alive will sleep, or at least choose not to act, for the rest of 
their lives might do just as well in terms of making people’s lives go well as a public policy designed 
to maximize everyone’s lifetime (apparent) genuine preference satisfaction, provided each policy 
ensured that the people had the same amount of opportunity to carry out potential voluntary 
transactions.27 That seems, to me, implausible. And while this is of course a fanciful example, I think 
it gets at an important point about the philosophical foundation of Sugden’s view. Specifically, it 
 
26 For a recent, related argument against the view that freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable, see Gustafsson 2020. 
27 Of course, a similar objection might be leveled against my opportunity-based proposal for measuring changes in 
people’s genuine preference satisfaction. This proposal too may see little difference between two policies that were equal 
in terms of the opportunity for genuine preference satisfaction they allowed for—at least initially. However, unlike 
Sugden’s proposal, it would certainly recognize a difference between the policies if just one were to actually lead to 
improvements in genuine preference satisfaction. This is because it recognizes that what economists should ultimately be 
concerned with—improvements in genuine preference satisfaction—would be realized with only one of the policies, 
making the other policy a failure with respect to what ultimately matters. Sugden’s approach, in contrast, makes no 
distinction between opportunity’s practical use and its ultimate importance, and so cannot recognize any similar failure in 
the analogous case. 
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suggests that while opportunities might be a good target for welfare economists’ focus in measuring 
and tracking what ultimately matters, they are not themselves what ultimately matters. Instead, what 
ultimately matters is how well people’s lives go. And whereas, as we’ve seen, the quality of people’s 
lives can be plausibly analyzed in terms of genuine preference satisfaction, their quality does not 
seem plausibly analyzable in terms of opportunity. Thus, while opportunities might represent an 
effective means of measuring or tracking what should ultimately matter to welfare economists, they 
do not seem to be what should be taken to ultimately matter themselves.28 
 In any case, there does seem to be a ring of truth in the thought that having more options is 
invariably better for people than having fewer. This, I think, is because genuine preferences could in 
principle have any object. That is, any possible alternative could in principle be genuinely preferred 
by a subject over any other. That being so, for any possible alternative, having the alternative 
available to one could allow one to satisfy one’s potential genuine preference for it; and not having 
that alternative available could only prevent one from satisfying one’s potential genuine preference 
for it. If one never actually genuinely prefers the alternative, no harm is done: one would never have 
attempted to satisfy it in the first place. But having the alternative available leaves open that one’s 
potential genuine preference for it could be satisfied. To put the point slightly differently: it’s never 
in itself bad to have more alternatives available to one.29 Either one does not genuinely prefer the 
alternative, in which case the alternative is irrelevant to one, or one does genuinely prefer the 
alternative, in which case one can attempt to bring it about. Since this is true of every possible 
alternative, it follows that having more alternatives available to one could in itself only be good, and 
 
28 Arneson (1999) appeals to a similar point in renouncing his view of egalitarian distributive justice on which the 
“currency” of egalitarian justice, or what justice requires that people be made equal in, is opportunity for welfare. 
29 Here it might be objected: wouldn’t it be in itself bad to have more alternatives available to one, at least given the view 
of welfare proposed here, if one simply genuinely preferred to have fewer alternatives? It would not. This is because, 
even here, what would be in itself bad for one on the view could not be the fact that one actually had more alternatives 
(or the actual frustration of one’s genuine preference), but could only be the appearance one had of having more 
alternatives (or the apparent frustration of one’s genuine preference).  
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could never be bad. Of course, sometimes having too many alternatives available to one can lead to 
excessive indecision. And that might be bad. But here it is not the having of the alternatives itself, 
but rather the lack of decisiveness, that is bad. Accordingly, for any alternatives, having more could 
in itself only be good, and having fewer could in itself only be bad. Importantly, though, and as this 
discussion illustrates, this is not because having more alternatives is in itself good for one and having 
fewer alternatives is in itself bad for one. Rather, these things are good and bad for one in virtue of 
their leaving open or closing the possibility of one’s genuine preferences for them being satisfied. In 
that case, it is again the satisfaction of genuine preference that explains the plausibility of Sugden’s 
key hypothesis. 
 I conclude, therefore, that the current analysis should be preferred to Sugden’s. It offers a 
plausible explanation of the apparent plausibility of Sugden’s view, reaches more intuitively plausible 
verdicts about particular policy choices, and offers a more plausible account of what should 
ultimately matter to economists with respect to well-being public policy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Let me sum up. Economists who are concerned with changes in welfare have generally focused on 
preference, and have taken one of two approaches to analyzing preference’s connections to choice 
and welfare. As we’ve seen, these revealed preference and latent preference approaches fail, in large 
part due to their neglect of the distinction between genuine and behavioral preferences. Once we 
recognize this distinction, we see not only where exactly these approaches went wrong, but also 
what it is that welfare economists should be focused on in making policy decisions that affect 
people’s welfare. Specifically, they should be focused on the apparent satisfaction of people’s 
genuine preferences. But since, as a mental state, such apparent satisfaction does not seem amenable 
to reliable measurement, welfare economists must likely instead focus on something else, perhaps 
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like opportunity for apparent genuine preference satisfaction, in attempt to measure or track how 
different policies might affect apparent genuine preference satisfaction. In addition to its intuitive 
plausibility, this approach plausibly explains both the ring of truth in, and ultimate inadequacy of, 
two other leading analyses of these issues in welfare economics. Each of these analyses seems 
plausible to the extent it does in virtue of facts about the distinction between behavioral and genuine 
preference, as well as facts about the ultimate importance of apparent genuine preference 
satisfaction for welfare. I conclude, then, that the current analysis significantly clears up and 
advances the central debate in the field of welfare economics, or the debate regarding the precise 















30 Many thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. And special thanks to Tyler DesRoches for many 
helpful comments, suggestions, and discussions. 
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